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Abstract
This paper investigates the implications of a nonlinear Phillips curve for the derivation of
optimal monetary policy rules. Combined with a quadratic loss function, the optimal policy is
also nonlinear, with the policy-maker increasing interest rates by a larger amount when in5ation
or output are above target than the amount it will reduce them when they are below target.
Speci7cally, the main prediction of our model is that such a source of nonlinearity leads to the
inclusion of the interaction between expected in5ation and the output gap in an otherwise linear
Taylor rule. We 7nd empirical support for this type of asymmetries in the interest rate-setting
behaviour of four European central banks but none for the US Fed.
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1. Introduction
For the most part, derivations of optimal rules for the conduct of monetary policy
have taken place in a linear–quadratic (L-Q) framework, stemming from the combina-
tion of a quadratic objective function for the policymaker and a linear dynamic system
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describing the economy; cf., inter alia, Taylor (1993, 1999), Svensson (1997) and
Clarida et al. (1998, 2000). When the policy instrument is a short-term interest rate,
this combination leads to a linear reaction function (Taylor rule) whereby central banks
adjust nominal interest rates proportionally to in5ation and output deviations from their
targets.
There are, however, at least three good motives to challenge the L-Q paradigm
underlying linear Taylor rules. First, it has been recognised for some time that the
short-run in5ation–output trade-oI may be nonlinear. For instance, convexity may arise
under the traditional Keynesian assumption that nominal wages are 5exible upwards but
rigid downwards, giving rise to a quasi-convex AS schedule; cf. Baily (1978). More
recently, Akerlof et al. (1996) have further elaborated on this argument claiming that
even a downward-sloping Phillips curve (in the in5ation–unemployment space) might
hold in the long run at very low rates of in5ation due to the existence of money illusion
on the part of the workers when there is a price stability. Conversely, Stiglitz (1997)
argues in favour of a concave relationship when the output gap is negative on the
grounds that 7rms operating under monopolistic competition may exhibit increasingly
greater willingness to reduce prices under weak demand to avoid being undercut by
rival 7rms. Orphanides and Wieland (2000) is, to our knowledge, the 7rst paper to
consider this type of nonlinearity in the derivation of optimal reaction functions. In
particular, they allow for a zone-linear Phillips curve where in5ation is essentially
stable for a range of output gaps and changes outside this range, providing in this way
a good theoretical rationale for in5ation-zone as opposed to in5ation point-targeting
behaviour by central banks. From an empirical viewpoint, Latxon et al. (1995, 1999),
,Alvarez-Lois (2000), Gerlach (2000) and others have presented evidence in favour of
a convex shape for several European countries and the US whereby the in5ationary
tendencies of capacity constraints on prices imply a considerably steeper Phillips curve
when the output gap is positive than when it is negative. In every case, the derived
implication is an asymmetric response of in5ation with respect to the output gap.
Secondly, there is a growing body of research that departs from the standard as-
sumption of a quadratic loss function by acknowledging the possibility that central
banks may have asymmetric preferences with respect to in5ation and/or output gaps.
For example, given that some central bankers are supposed to be accountable to elected
political oMcials, Cukierman (1999) points out that they may have greater aversion to
recessions than to expansions. Under these asymmetric preferences, an in5ation bias
Na la Barro–Gordon emerges even when the policy-maker targets the natural output
level rather than a larger level. By contrast, Mishkin and Posen (1997) argue that a
de5ation bias might be a more likely outcome, since independent central banks often
tend to deny the possibility that an expansionary monetary policy stance can reduce
cyclical unemployment, and report some favourable evidence to this viewpoint for
the Bank of Canada and the Bank of England. Clarida and Gertler (1997), in turn,
have tested formally for the null hypothesis of symmetry and found evidence against
it for the Bundesbank. More recently, Orphanides and Wieland (2000), Ruge-Murcia
(2002), Dolado et al. (2002), Surico (2002) and Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) have
analysed the implications for the derivation of interest-rate reaction functions of assum-
ing asymmetric preferences with respect to in5ation and/or output by the policy-maker.
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In particular, Dolado et al. (2002) 7nd that, in the absence of certainty equivalence,
when the central banker associates a larger loss to positive than to negative in5ation
deviations, uncertainty induces a prudent behaviour by the monetary authorities which
is re5ected by the inclusion of the conditional variance of in5ation as an additional
argument in the Taylor rule. Allowing as well for asymmetric preferences as regards
the output gap, Cukierman and Muscatelli (2002) provide evidence showing that cen-
tral banks in some G7 economies develop a precautionary demand for expansions and
for low in5ation once credibility building and disin5ation have been achieved.
Lastly, there is a third source of nonlinearity which stems from uncertainty regarding
the NAIRU or the trend growth rate of productivity. As Meyer et al. (2001) have
shown, in periods of heightened uncertainty about the NAIRU (like the second half of
the 1990s in the US following the IT-induced productivity acceleration), an optimal
updating rule of the NAIRU leads to a nonlinear interest-rate policy according to
which policy-makers are more cautious about adjusting interest rates in response to
small output gaps than in a standard linear Taylor rule but more aggressive when they
reach a certain threshold.
In view of these arguments, our goal of this paper is to extend the available evidence
on the presence of asymmetric features in monetary policy rules. Speci7cally, our
focus is restricted to the 7rst source of nonlinearity. To this end, we re-examine the
analytical implications of assuming a nonlinear short-term in5ation–output trade-oI in
the derivation of such rules and provide some empirical evidence consistent with this
nonlinearity. By assuming a quadratic functional form for the eIects of the output gap
in an accelerationist Phillips curve we obtain a modi7ed Taylor rule which only diIers
from the conventional linear speci7cation in that it includes an interaction between
expected in5ation and the output gap as an additional term in the Euler equation.
This simple device allows us to capture the asymmetric response of the interest rate to
in5ation and output gaps which turns out to be optimal in this framework. 1 Our results
echo those recently derived by Schaling (1999) in a more restricted set-up than ours.
Deriving this modi7ed policy rule for the speci7c model considered here, together a
cross-country empirical analysis supporting the usefulness of the proposed approach, is
the contribution of the paper to the literature.
Our empirical approach relies upon testing for the statistical signi7cance of the in-
teraction term in the estimation of two types of models. First, we consider an Euler
equation speci7cation, in line with the in5uential approach by Clarida et al. (1998) to
capture the performance of a policy rule in describing the evolution of a continuously
adjusted short-term interest rate, like (say) an overnight interest rate. Second, we con-
sider an ordered probit model which, as pointed out by Dolado and Mar,.a-Dolores
(2002), is a useful modelling strategy to analyse the determinants of decisions con-
cerning adjustments in interest rates which only take place irregularly and in discrete
increments, as is the case of discount rates. The proposed methodologies are applied
to estimate the interest rate-setting behaviour of three European central banks (Banque
1 Kim et al. (2002) have recently investigated the nature of nonlinearities in monetary policy rules using
Hamilton’s (2001) 5exible nonlinear methodology and conclude that our proposed interaction term is the
one that does best in characterising nonlinear policy rules in the US Fed up to 1979.
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de France, Bundesbank and Banco de Espan˜a), the US Federal Reserve and the
(surrogate) European Central Bank (ECB) over diIerent sample periods.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic theory
behind derivation of the optimal interest-rate reaction function under a nonlinear Phillips
curve in a simple model along the lines of Svensson (1997). With this illustrative model
in mind, we derive the main features of the nonlinear policy rule which serves as a
benchmark for the empirical section. Section 3 presents the empirical results obtained
from applying the two econometric methodologies described above to 7ve central banks.
Finally, Section 4 concludes.
2. Policy rules with a nonlinear Phillips curve
2.1. Basic principles
To make the basic point of the paper without introducing unnecessary complications,
we modify a minimalist backward-looking model of the economy proposed by Svensson
(1997) by allowing for a nonlinear Phillips curve. In this set-up, in5ation is determined
by an accelerationist Phillips curve, output follows a simple autoregressive process
and the monetary policy instrument is a short-term nominal interest rate. Since the
model is not based on explicit microfoundations, as in Clarida et al. (1998, 2000) or
Woodford (1999), issues related to credibility and reputation are left aside, in exchange
for expositional simplicity.
In every period, the policy-maker sets the nominal interest rate, i, with the aim of
maintaining in5ation deviations from a target, ˜=−∗, and the output gap, y˜, close to
zero. Assuming a quadratic per-period loss function in in5ation and output performance,
L(˜t ; y˜ t) = 12 [˜
2
t + y˜
2
t], and a 7xed discount rate, , the policy-makers’s objective in
period t is to minimise the expected present discounted value of the per-period losses:
Et
∞∑
s=0
sL(˜t+s; y˜ t+s) (1)
subject to the following two equations describing the evolution of the economy:
t+1 = t + 
f(y˜ t) + u; t+1 (2)
with
f(y˜ t) = y˜ t + y˜2t ; y˜ t ¿− 1=2; (3)
and
y˜ t+1 = y˜ t + xt − rt + uy; t+1; (4)
where Et is the conditional expectations operator,  and ∈ [0; 1), and u; t+1 and uy; t+1
are zero-mean normally distributed shocks.
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Eq. (2) represents an accelerationist Phillips curve (or AS schedule) where the out-
put gap enters in a nonlinear way, as de7ned in Eq. (3). Linearity in (3) is recovered
when  = 0 and the function is convex (concave) if ¿ 0 (¡ 0). 2 We assume the
function to be increasing (1 + 2y˜¿ 0) since this is likely to be the case for real-
istic values of  and y˜ t . Eq. (4), in turn, is an IS schedule where the output gap
exhibits sluggish adjustment, and depends on the real interest rate (rt = it − Ett+1),
and on a predetermined/exogenous variable, xt , possibly capturing other determinants
of interest-rate setting in open economies (see, e.g. Ball, 1998). The real interest rate
aIects output with one-period lag and, therefore, aIects in5ation with a two-period
lag. This timing convention is in line with the extensive literature on the transmission
mechanism of monetary policy which establishes that an innovation in monetary policy
leads to a change in output in the short run with in5ation only changing slowly later
on (see e.g., Christiano et al., 1999).
Totally diIerentiating (1) with respect to it , subject to (2) – (4), yields the following
Euler equation:
Et y˜ t+1 + Et y˜ t+2 + 
Et ˜t+2(1 + 2y˜ t+1) = 0: (5)
Using (4) to replace Et y˜ t+2 in terms of Et y˜ t+1, Etxt+1 and Etrt+1, and solving for
i in period t implies the following Taylor rule:
it = c1Et−1˜t+1 + c2Et−1y˜ t + c3Et−1xt + c4Et−1(˜t+1y˜ t); (6)
where the ci’s coeMcients are functions from the set of structural parameters (; 
; ; ;
;  and ) so that c1 = 1 + 
=; c2 = (1 + 2)=; c3 = = and c4 = 2
=.
The modi7ed Taylor rule in (6) resembles a linear one except for the last term,
namely, the interaction of expected in5ation and the output gap. The intuition for the
presence of this interaction term in the Euler equation is simple. If, for example,
in5ation is expected to be above its target at period t + 1, the real interest rate will
be below its equilibrium value at period t which, in turn, causes a higher output gap
at t + 1 and higher in5ationary pressure at t + 2. In the linear case, the policy-maker
increases the interest rate by c1Et−1˜t+1. However, if the Phillips curve is convex
(¿ 0), then the future in5ationary pressure caused by the higher output gap will
turn out to be larger than in the linear case. The policy-maker, anticipating this higher
pressure captured by the interaction term, will react more forcefully, since in this
case c4¿ 0. Conversely, if the Phillips curve is concave (¡ 0), future in5ationary
pressure will be lower than in the linear case and the increase in the interest rate
will be smaller (c4¡ 0). A similar intuition can be used to interpret an asymmetric
response with respect to the output gap. If output is above trend at t, then the output
gap at t + 1 will be positive as well, given the serial correlation in (4), leading to
2 The quadratic functional form could be interpreted as a second-order approximation around y˜=0 to other
more 5exible functional forms like the function g(y˜) discussed below (see Schaling, 1999) or the Linex
function used by Nobay and Peel (2000). However, when such a more general shapes are considered as
the primitive functional forms, the disturbance in Eq. (8) below will contain the approximation error which
depends on forecasts and therefore is not uncorrelated with the instrumental variables. For this reason, we
have taken the quadratic function as the primitive functional form.
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Table 1
Estimated nonlinear Phillips curves
Ut = 
y˜ t−1 + 
y˜2t−1 + u; t

ˆ ˆ
Germany 0:17∗∗ 0:41∗∗
(0.02) (0.16)
France 0:12∗∗ 0:33∗∗
(0.03) (0.14)
Spain 0:10∗∗ 0:38∗∗
(0.02) (0.17)
US 0:10∗∗ 0.09
(0.01) (0.05)
Euro area 0:19∗∗ 0:29∗
(0.03) (0.15)
Note: White’s standard errors in parentheses; ∗ and ∗∗ denotes statistical signi7cance at the 10% and 5%
signi7cance levels, respectively.
a higher in5ationary pressure at t + 2 than in the linear case because of the convex
Phillips curve (see Table 1).
Although the previous argument has been derived in an Euler-equation context, it
is interesting to know if a closed-form solution can be obtained. Unfortunately, since
our model deviates from the L-Q framework (quadratic objective but nonlinear eco-
nomic structure), the value function in the Bellman equation associated to (1) is not
quadratic. Thus, the well-known arguments used by Svensson (1997, Appendix B)
in order to derive an analytical solution of the optimal interest-rate reaction function
in this backward-looking model cannot be applied. Instead, one should rely upon nu-
merical dynamic programming algorithms, as the ones used by Orphanides and Wieland
(2000), to obtain approximate solutions. However, as Schaling (1999) has shown, if
the policy-maker is a pure point-in5ation targetter (=0) and, for algebraic purposes,
a slightly modi7ed function g(y˜ t) = y˜ t=(1 − y˜ t) is used instead of the quadratic
f(y˜ t) adopted in (2), then a simple closed-form solution exists. 3 In eIect, due to the
recursive dynamic structure of (2) and (4), the interest rate in period t should be set to
achieve Et(˜t+2) = 0. Assuming a deterministic problem (i.e., that the variances of the
shocks in (2) and (4), u and uy, are zero) yields the following closed-form solution
for the nominal interest rate:
it =
(1=
)[˜t + 
f(y˜ t)]
1− (=
)[˜t + 
f(y˜ t)] + t + f(y˜ t) + y˜ t + xt ; (7)
where it is a nonlinear function of the in5ation and output gaps which, when  tends to
zero, collapses to the conventional linear Taylor rule in this type of backward-looking
3 Note that a second-order Taylor expansion of g(y˜ t)=y˜ t =(1−y˜ t) around y˜ t=0 yields g(y˜ t) ≈ y˜ t+y˜2t
that is exactly the quadratic function, f(y˜ t), considered in (3). For a realistic range of values of y˜ t , like
[− 0:04; 0:04] and  = 0:3 (see the estimates reported in Table 1), the two functions behave very closely.
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model (see Svensson, 1997). The intuition for the presence of the nonlinear term in
(7) is the same as the one provided for the interaction term in the Euler equation.
For example, considering, for illustrative purposes, that 
=0:5; =1, and =0:3, the
appropriate interest rate changes stemming from ±0:5% in5ation gaps are ±1:5% in the
linear case whereas they are 1.93% and −1:27%, respectively, in the nonlinear case.
Hence, when the Phillips curve is convex, the policy-maker reacts more forcefully (in
absolute value) to positive in5ation gaps than to negative gaps, and the opposite will
happen under concavity (¡ 0). 4
Finally, a brief comment is oIered about the implications of having a nonlinear
Phillips curve on the in5ation bias which typically occurs in the well-known Barro–
Gordon’s analysis of discretionary monetary policy. Let us consider, for simplicity, a
static optimisation problem where the loss function is L(; y)= 12 [
2+(y−ky∗)2], with
k ¿ 1 capturing the existence of labour-market rigidities or distorting taxes. 5 Assume
that the structure of the economy is given by the Phillips curve  = e + g(y˜) and
y˜ = p + uy, where e represents the agents’ rational expectation of ; y˜ is considered
to be the control variable which depends linearly on a deterministic policy instrument,
p, and uy is an innovation. Then, taking expectations (E) in the 7rst-order condition
of the optimal discretionary policy yields:
e = E
k − 1
[1 + z]2
y∗ − E z
[1 + z]3
;
where z =  − e. Note that with  = 0, the standard in5ation bias, (k − 1)y∗,
is recovered. De7ning h(z) = z=(1 + z)3, we know from Jensen’s inequality that
Eh(z)¡h(Ez) if h(z) is concave. It can be easily checked that sign h′′(z)=−sign().
Thus, convexity of the Phillips curve, ¿ 0, implies concavity of h(z). Moreover,
since in equilibrium (when z = 0) h(Ez) = 0, we get Eh(z)¡ 0. Thereby, even when
k = 1, convexity of the Phillips curve implies, on average, a positive in5ation bias
as long as there is output stabilisation (¿ 0). Likewise, it is easy to check that,
since Eg(y˜) = 0 when z = 0, then convexity leads to Ey˜¡ 0, namely, the expected
level of output is lower than the natural level. The intuition for this de5ation bias
in expected output stems from the asymmetric interest rate-setting behaviour under a
convex Phillips curve whereby policy-makers, in achieving a given in5ation target,
have a greater incentive to avoid periods of excess demand, as these require longer
and/or more severe recessions to undo the in5ation generated when output is above
target. 6
4 Allowing for uncertainty in the form of shocks to the output gap (uy; t+1) in (4), a closed-form solution
no longer exists but it can be proved that the interest-rate response to in5ation gaps will be larger than in
the model without uncertainty (see Schaling, 1999).
5 Without loss of generality, we set ∗ = 0.
6 Nobay and Peel (2000) obtain similar results, except that the sign of the in5ation bias is ambiguous,
using a Linex functional form, ‘(y˜) =  −1(e
 y˜ − 1).
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2.2. Econometric speci0cations
To assess the empirical support of the departure of the L-Q framework considered
here, we rely upon two alternative econometric strategies which are described in turn.
2.2.1. Euler equation approach
First, we test for the statistical signi7cance of the interaction term directly in the
Euler equation derived in (6). For that, we replace the expectations by realised values
in (6), yielding the following policy rule in t:
it = cnst + c1˜t+k + c2y˜ t + c3xt + c4(˜t+k y˜ t) + "1it−1 + #t ; (8)
where, for estimation purposes, we have introduced two slight modi7cations in Eq. (8).
First, in accord with most of the empirical literature, we take k =12, instead of k =1,
to be the horizon used by central banks in forecasting in5ation when data has monthly
frequency as it is in our case. And, secondly, as is also conventional, we allow for a
lagged dependent variable to capture interest-rate smoothing for which there are several
motivations in the literature. While it is not possible to recover all structural parameters
from the estimated coeMcients in (8), what really matters from the viewpoint of this
paper is that c4 is the only coeMcient which embodies information about the nonlinear
Phillips curve, so that the restriction =0 implies c4 = 0. Indeed, it is straightforward
to check that the ratio c4=2(c1−1) yields a direct estimate of . Hence testing H0:=0
is equivalent to testing H0: c4 = 0 as long as c1 is diIerent from unity. Since (8) is
linear in the coeMcients, the key advantage of directly testing H0: c4 =0 is that it does
not require estimating a nonlinear model in the parameters. As for the error term in
(8) it is de7ned as
#t =−[c1(˜t+k − Et−1˜t+k) + c2(y˜ t − Et−1y˜ k) + c3(xt − Et−1xt)
+ c4(˜t+k y˜ t)− Et−1(˜t+k y˜ t)];
where the term in brackets is a linear combination of forecast errors and therefore
orthogonal to any variable in the information set available at t− 1. As is conventional
in models involving rational expectations, the estimation method relies upon the choice
of a set of instruments, Zt , from the set of variables within the central bank’s informa-
tion set, such as lagged variables that help forecast in5ation and output or any other
contemporaneous variables that are uncorrelated with the policy rule shock, #t . Then,
the generalized method of moments (GMM) can be used to estimate the parameter
vector in (8) by exploiting the set of orthogonality conditions E(#t=Zt) = 0. Since the
composite disturbance has an MA(k) representation, due to the overlapping nature of
the forecast errors, the Hansen–Hodrick weighting var–cov matrix, which puts a weight
of 1 on the 7rst k covariances and 0 on all others, is used to implement GMM. Finally,
Hansen’s J test is used to test the over-identi7cation restrictions.
2.2.2. Ordered probit approach
Secondly, to check how relevant is the role the interaction term in other types
of interest-rate reaction functions, we estimate an ordered probit model which is the
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appropriate econometric framework to analyse the determinants of decisions about the
discrete and infrequent adjustments that characterise the behaviour of discount rates (see
Dolado and Mar,.a-Dolores, 2002). Under this approach, the underlying assumption is
that the policy-maker takes a decision every period about adjusting a discount rate in
terms of the following changes: Large or small reductions, no change, and large and
small increases. Speci7cally, we will assume that these changes are discrete and use
a breakdown of adjustments into the following 7ve categories, captured by a set of
dummy variables, which are ordered in steps of 25 basis points each:
(large decrease) ct = 1⇔ Uit ¡− 0:25;
(small decrease) ct = 2⇔ Uit ∈ [− 0:25; 0);
(no change) ct = 3⇔ Uit = 0;
(small increase) ct = 4⇔ Uit ∈ (0; 0:25];
(large increase) ct = 5⇔ Uit ¿ 0:25:
The observed dummy variable, ct , depends on a latent index, c∗t , according to the
following rule:
ct =


1 if c∗t 6 
1;
2 if 
1¡c∗t 6 
2;
3 if 
2¡c∗t 6 
3;
4 if 
3¡c∗t 6 
4;
5 if c∗t ¿ 
4;
where c∗t is taken to be a latent continuous random variable triggering adjustments and
the 
’s are the thresholds that the latent variable must cross to change the value of ct .
The underlying index is assumed to depend linearly on a set of covariates, xt , such
that
c∗t = 
′xt + %t = 1Et(˜t+k) + 2y˜ t + 3Et(˜t+k y˜ t) + ′4st + %t : (9)
The 7rst three regressors in (9) mimic those considered in the derivation of the
Euler equation while the nature of the remaining regressors, st , will be discussed in
Section 3. Although this speci7cation has not been derived from a theoretical model
on the adjustment decisions, it is bound to capture the same sort of considerations
as in (6), this time in the discrete change framework which characterises the evo-
lution of discount rates. Hence, we loosely interpret a test of H0: 3 = 0 as indirect
evidence for H0: = 0. Assuming that %t follows a n.i.d. (0; &2% ), estimates of the pa-
rameter vector (
; ) are then obtained by maximising the following likelihood function
9
(see Maddala, 1983):
l(
; ) =
∑
t∈yt=1
log((
1 − ′xt) +
4∑
j=2
∑
t∈yt=j
log(((
j − ′xt)
−((
j−1 − ′xt)) +
∑
t∈yt=5
log(1− ((
4 − ′xt));
where ((:) is the cumulative Gaussian distribution function.
3. Estimation results
3.1. Data
To estimate Eq. (8), we have used monthly data for three European countries
(Germany, France and Spain) and the US. The sample periods are 1980(8)–l997(12)
for Germany, 1988(7)–1997(12) for France, 1989(5)–1997(12) for Spain and 1984(1)
–2001(9) for US. They correspond to recent spells where there was a virtually au-
tonomous control over domestic monetary policy in each case. We have also consid-
ered quarterly data for the Euro area over the period 1984(Q1) to 2001(Q3) which
has been constructed by OECD using weighted averages of the individual countries
with GDP-weights measured in units of PPP at 1995 prices. In this case, k = 4 has
been chosen. The idea is to study how a “surrogate” ECB would have behaved had it
exerted monetary control over the Euro area during a period comprising the pre-EMU
period (before 1999(Q1)) and afterwards. 7
The short-term intervention interest rates in (8) are: (i) overnight interest rates in
Germany and France; (ii) the marginal intervention rate of auctions of “Certi7cados del
Banco de Espan˜a” in Spain; (iii) the Fed-Fund rate in the US; and (iv) a GDP-weighted
average of short-term intervention interest rates for the EMU countries. For in5ation we
use the annual (t=t− 12 basis) percentage rate in the CPI. For output we use (logged)
Industrial Production Index and (logged) GDP for the Euro area (all variables are
seasonally adjusted). To measure the output gap, we detrend (logged) output using the
HP 7lter with a coeMcient of 14.800 for the four individual countries and 1600 for
the Euro area. 8
As regards the in5ation target, ∗, we consider a departure from the usual assumption
that it is constant, as in Clarida et al. (1998), since in some countries in5ation has
slowly converged from above to its target value implying that a constant target seems
to be less plausible than a gradually moving one. Instead we adopt a time-varying
in5ation target, ∗t , according to the following considerations: (i) for Germany, we
take the in5ation target to be the one established by the Bundesbank in its annual
reports; (ii) for France, the German target in5ation rate, given the close links between
7 As a referee has pointed out, this exercise implicitly assumes that the ECB has the same preferences as
national central banks before EMU. Note, however, that Alesina et al. (2001) dispute this assumption.
8 The residuals from adjusting a cubic trend to logged output led to similar results.
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both economies within EMU; 9 (iii) for Spain, the oMcial in5ation rate in the budget
laws up to 1995 and the target in5ation rate reported by the Bank of Spain since
1996; (iv) for US, the target in5ation rates in the reports of the Council of Economic
Advisors; and 7nally (v), for the Euro-zone, the German target in5ation rate again
since German monetary policy served as an anchor to most of the other Euro area
countries over the sample. 10 Annual in5ation target rates have been interpolated to a
monthly frequency for the individual countries, and to a quarterly frequency for the
Euro area. 11 For the sake of completeness, however, results obtained with a constant
in5ation target are also reported below. As for the xt variable, the German interest
rate has been used for France and Spain, the US interest rate for Germany and the
Euro area, and the growth rates of borrowed and total reserves for the US. The list of
instruments is: a constant term, two lags of the interest rate, six lags of the in5ation
gap, six lags of the output gap, four lags of the interaction of in5ation and output
lags, two lags of (logged) raw materials price index. Further, in the case of the three
European countries, two lags of the German interest rate (for France and Spain) and
of the US interest rate (for Germany), and two lags of the (logged) eIective real
exchange rate have been included.
To estimate Eq. (9), we have used the repo rate for France, the marginal target rate
in the interbank reserves market for Spain, the discount rate for Germany, and the target
Funds rate for the US. Although these series have higher frequency, the changes have
been aggregated to a 7xed interval of a month, since this is the frequency at which
information on in5ation, output and some on the other determinants of interest-rate
setting arrives. The sample periods are the same as above. Given that among the st
variables we allow for duration eIects, i.e., the time elapsed since the last change, the
“surrogate” ECB has not been included in this econometric exercise, since a weighted
aggregation of the durations of discount rates in each individual central bank would be
meaningless.
3.2. Preliminary analysis: A nonlinear Phillips curve?
To get some preliminary evidence on the key channel for a nonlinear policy rule
highlighted in this paper, Table 1 reports the results from estimating the nonlinear
speci7cation chosen for the Phillips curve in (2). For that, the change in in5ation at
t;Ut , has been regressed on f(yt−1) to estimate the parameters 
 and . A positive
and statistically signi7cant value of  implies a convex Phillips curve. 12 The basic
7nding is that there is evidence favourable to a convex Phillips curve in all cases
except in the US. For illustrative purposes, Fig. 1 depicts scatter plots of lagged output
9 The in5ation target in this case is constant since the German target rate did not change from 2% during
the sample period considered for France.
10 In a previous version of this paper (see Dolado et al., 2000) we estimated directly the response of
interest rates to positive and negative, and large and small, in5ation and output gaps. To have observations
of diIerent sign in in5ation gaps, the use of time-varying in5ation targets was needed.
11 The data on the time-varying in5ation target rates are available upon request.
12 White’s robust standard errors have been used to compute the t-ratios of 
ˆ and ˆ since, as pointed out
by Dolado et al. (2002), there is strong evidence of a GARCH process in the residuals of such equations.
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Fig. 1. Phillips curves.
gap (horizontal axis) against change in in5ation (vertical axis), together with the 7tted
quadratic function, for the US and the Euro area. As can be observed, the 7tted curve
is clearly convex in the Euro zone whereas it cannot be distinguished from a linear
one in the US. 13 One possible explanation for these contrasting results could be that
European labour markets are known to suIer from higher real wage rigidity than the
US labour market, giving rise to a steeper short-run in5ation–output trade-oI when
output is above the natural level than when it is below it. For example, Nickell (1997)
reports conclusive evidence about higher downwards than upwards wage rigidity in
Europe, whereas such is not the case in the more 5exible US labour market. Thus, this
preliminary evidence seemingly supports the existence of a convex Phillips curve, at
least in the three European countries and in the Euro area.
13 Alvarez-Lois (2000) 7nds a nonlinear relation between the change in in5ation and a capacity utiliza-
tion for the US. However, he uses quarterly data, whose lower frequency facilitates 7nding a nonlinear
relationship, and his sample period is much longer, from 1960(Ql) to 2000(Ql).
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3.3. Nonlinear Taylor rules
Table 2 displays the results obtained from estimating Eq. (8) by the GMM method
described above. For each country, three speci7cations are presented in panels A, B
and C. 14 Results in panel A correspond to the speci7cation excluding the xt variables
and allowing for time-varying in5ation target, whereas those in panel B include xt .
For the US and the Euro area, the coeMcients on xt for the diIerent proxies that we
tried were never statistically signi7cant and therefore are not reported. Finally, panel C
displays the results obtained with a constant in5ation rate and allowing for xt . As for
the coeMcients on the lagged dependent variables, denoted in the table by "i(i=1; 2),
we found that only one lag was signi7cant in the case of the three European countries
whereas two lags were needed for the US and the Euro area. The existence of an AR
(2) speci7cation for the US agrees with the 7ndings of Clarida et al. (1998, 2000).
In general, it is worth noticing that the p-values of the J-test (denoted as p-J in
Table 2) do not reject the over-identifying restrictions. Further, the p-values of the
F-test about the joint signi7cance of the coeMcients obtained in the regression of
˜t+k ; y˜ t and (˜t+k y˜ t) on the set of instruments is also reported since a poor 7t in the
7rst stage of the GMM procedure may raise concern about lack of identi7cation (see
Arellano et al., 1999).
The basic result to highlight is that the estimated coeMcient c4 on the interaction
term is always highly signi7cant for the three European countries and the Euro area.
By contrast, it is not signi7cant for the US, in accord with the evidence in the pre-
vious subsection and with the 7ndings of Dolado et al. (2002) for the US using a
longer sample period. Since the use of c4 to test indirectly for the signi7cance of 
relies on c1 being above unity it is worth discussing the results in this respect. 15 In
all cases, except in France (panel B) and Spain, the point estimates of c1 are above
unity, in line with an in5ation-stabilising policy rule as explained by Clarida et al.
(1998, 2000). Nonetheless, as those authors have pointed out, when the relevant xt
variable is a foreign interest rate, as in the three European countries, the correct in-
terpretation is that the policy rule is a weighted average of the German interest rate
for France and Spain, and the US interest rate for Germany (with a weight of c3)
and a baseline policy rule (with a weight of 1− c3). Thus the coeMcient on expected
in5ation for these countries should be computed as c1=(1 − c3) yielding estimates of
1.25, 1.30 and 1.10 in Germany, France and Spain, respectively, according to the
estimates of c3 reported in panel B. The remaining coeMcients are signi7cant and
correctly signed in all speci7cations. Finally, the results obtained for a constant in-
5ation target are fairly similar to the ones with a time-varying target, despite some
noticeable changes in the size of the constant term and c2. In any case, the estimated
coeMcient on the interaction term remains signi7cant, in agreement with the previous
results.
14 For France panel C is excluded since the German in5ation target is constant for the chosen sample
period.
15 Recall that c1 = 1 + 
= in (6), with all the parameters being positive.
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Table 2
Estimated nonlinear reaction functions
"1 "2 cnst c1 c2 c3 c4 &% p-J p-F
Germany
(A) ∗ variable
k = 12 0.91 — 5.87 1.11 0.46 — 0.11 0.33 0.086 0.00/0.00/0.02
(0.01) — (0.25) (0.29) (0.16) — (0.04)
(B) k = 12 0.91 — 4.80 1.05 0.39 0.16 0.17 0.31 0.085 0.00/0.00/0.01
+ US interest rate (0.01) — (0.29) (0.23) (0.14) (0.03) (0.03)
(C) ∗ constant
k = 12 0.90 — 4.27 1.29 0.56 0.11 0.14 0.33 0.086 0.00/0.00/0.01
+ US interest rate (0.02) — (0.51) (0.30) (0.16) (0.03) (0.03)
Sample period 1980:08 1997:12
France
(A) ∗ variablea
k = 12 0.92 — 6.42 1.23 0.87 — 0.30 0.57 0.074 0.00/0.00/0.01
(0.004) — (0.16) (0.18) (0.14) — (0.09)
(B) k = 12 0.68 — 3.66 0.47 0.34 0.64 0.14 0.53 0.085 0.00/0.00/0.01
+ German interest rate (0.039) — (0.17) (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Sample period 1988:07 1997:12
Spain
(A) ∗ variable
k = 12 0.95 — 8.08 0.88 0.16 — 0.10 0.51 0.102 0.03/0.00/0.02
(0.04) — (0.72) (0.24) (0.04) — (0.03)
(B) k = 12 0.93 — 7.36 0.78 0.14 0.29 0.10 0.49 0.097 0.002/0.00/0.02
+ German interest rate (0.02) — (1.64) (0.13) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
(C) ∗ constant
k = 12 0.95 — 5.20 0.96 0.36 0.16 0.23 0.48 0.095 0.00/0.00/0.01
+ German interest rate (0.01) — (0.53) (0.44) (0.04) (0.06) (0.11)
Sample period 1989:05 1997:12
US
(A) ∗ variable
k = 12 1.21 −0:34 4.06 1.92 0.25 — 0.31 0.25 0.085 0.00/0.00/0.01
(0.07) (0.06) (0.23) (0.30) (0.08) — (0.36)
(C) ∗ constant
k = 12 1.19 −0:37 2.93 2.16 0.26 — 0.45 0.33 0.078 0.00/0.00/0.01
(0.05) (0.04) (0.54) (0.37) (0.07) — (0.42)
Sample period 1984:01 2001:09
Euro area
(A) ∗ variable
k = 4 1.30 −0:43 2.86 1.46 0.82 — 0.40 0.45 0.035 0.00/0.00/0.02
(0.11) (0.10) (1.44) (0.69) (0.35) — (0.13)
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Table 2 (continued)
"1 "2 cnst c1 c2 c3 c4 &% p-J p-F
(C) ∗ constant
k = 4 1.36 −0:48 5.84 1.53 0.46 — 0.11 0.41 0.066 0.00/0.00/0.02
(0.11) (0.11) (0.45) (0.43) (0.12) — (0.05)
Sample period 1984:Q1 2001:Q3.
Note: Standard errors in parentheses; p-J is the p-value of the J -test of over-identifying restrictions; p-F
is the p-value of the F-test of the joint signi7cance of the coeMcients of ˜t+k ; y˜ t and (˜t+k y˜ t), respectively,
on the instruments.
a∗ in this case corresponds to a constant 2% German in5ation target.
Next, as discussed in Section 2, an estimate of  can be directly obtained from the
estimates of c1 and c4. Since for the three European countries the correct interpretation
of the coeMcient on expected in5ation seems to be c1=(1− c3), denoted as c˜1, we take
that value to compute the ratio given by c4=2(c˜1 − 1) using the estimated coeMcients
in panel B for the three European countries and those in panel A for the US and the
Euro area. That yields the following estimates of : 0:34 (Germany), 0.23 (France),
0.50 (Spain), 0.17 (US) and 0.33 (Euro zone). Note that these values are fairly similar
to those reported in Table 1. Indeed, using the delta method to compute 95% con7dence
intervals of , we cannot reject that the diIerences between both sets of coeMcients
are statistically insigni7cant. Further, the only country for which the t-ratio of ˆ is not
signi7cant is the US.
Finally, in order to ascertain the forecasting advantages of using the nonlinear Taylor
rules estimated above to track the evolution of the short-term interest rates in the
various cases under study, we computed the dynamically simulated 7tted values of
the linear and nonlinear models. The root-mean-squared error (RMSE) of the linear
models are 0.83 (Germany), 0.71 (France), 1.92 (Spain), 1.38 (Euro area) and 0.76
(US) whilst the corresponding RMSE for the nonlinear rules are 0.70, 0.55, 1.48, 1.21
and 0.73, respectively. To test for whether these RMSEs are statistically signi7cant, we
have implemented the test statistic for predictive accuracy proposed by Diebold and
Mariano (1995) which relies upon testing the null hypothesis H0: E(dt)=0 where dt is
the diIerence of the squared dynamically simulated residuals of two alternative models.
As shown by those authors, T 1=2 [d=$ is asymptotically distributed as N(0; 1), where [d
is the sample average of dt and $ is a nonparametric estimate of the long-run variance
of dt . The p-values of the corresponding test are: 0.0001 (Germany), 0.0002 (France),
0.0018 (Spain), 0.421 (US) and 0.0012 (Euro area). Thus, it appears that there are
substantial advantages in using the nonlinear speci7cation to predict the evolution of
the short-term interest rates in all cases except in the US, in agreement with the
evidence that a linear Phillips curve cannot be rejected for the latter country. As an
illustration of this improvement, Fig. 2 depicts, together with the interest rate, the
within-sample predictions in the Euro zone obtained with from a conventional linear
policy rule (dotted line), stemming from the estimation of (8) without the interaction
term, and from the modi7ed rule (thin solid line), allowing for it.
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Fig. 2. Taylor rule predictions for the Euro area.
3.4. Ordered probit model
As discussed above, the speci7c latent index of adjustments in (9) contains expected
in5ation (with k = 12), the output gap and the interaction between both variables plus
an additional set of controls, st . Among those variables, we have considered both the
change in the discount rate in the previous month, Uit−1, and the number of months
elapsed since the last intervention, Dt , to capture persistence in interventions. Likewise,
with the same motivation as the xt variables in (6), changes in the FF=DM real ex-
change rate (Urert) for France, and lagged changes of a foreign interest rate (Ui∗t−1)
have also been included. 16 Since the regressors in the probit model are assumed to
be uncorrelated with the error term, the procedure of replacing expectations of future
variables by their realized value becomes invalid in this case. Thus, rather than using
the previous approach, our strategy is based on constructing in5ation forecasts from
OLS regressions where the regressors are the instrumental variables used in the GMM
approach.
Table 3 shows the results of the above exercise. Most relevant from our viewpoint
is the 7nding that the coeMcient on the interaction term, 3, is estimated to be positive
and signi7cant for the three European countries and insigni7cant for the US, in broad
agreement with the result obtained earlier. Thus, the results seem to be fairly robust
to the use of this alternative methodology. Of independent interest are the 7ndings
that there are “duration” eIects, in the sense that the probability of an adjustment de-
pends positively on the time elapsed since the last intervention, and that the probability
increases when the real exchange rate depreciates or when foreign discount rates rise.
16 The German interest rate is used for France and Spain, and the US interest rate for Germany. Other
variables turned out to be not signi7cant.
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Table 3
Estimated ordered probit model
Variables Germany France Spain USA
˜t+12=t 0.86 0.12 0.27 0.30
(0.49) (0.04) (0.09) (0.12)
y˜ t 0.29 0.02 0.09 0.31
(0.21) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
˜t+12=t ∗ y˜ t 0.26 0.14 0.16 0.21
(0.12) (0.07) (0.06) (0.29)
Urert — 0.70 — —
— (0.17) — —
Ui∗t−1 — 1.94 0.93 —
— (0.53) (0.57) —
Uit−1 0.63 0.55 1.31 1.57
(0.24) (0.26) (0.48) (0.32)
Dt 0.18 0.12 0.05 0.18
(0.12) (0.04) (0.03) (0.08)

1 −1:06 −0:92 −1:41 −1:14
(0.11) (0.15) (0.20) (0.12)

2 −0:37 −0:15 −0:46 −0:26
(0.09) (0.13) (0.16) (0.02)

3 0.13 0.21 0.97 0.32
(0.09) (0.13) (0.19) (0.01)

4 1.23 1.29 1.53 1.48
(0.12) (0.17) (0.23) (0.16)
Log-likelihood −296:35 −135:89 −127:41 −251:30
4. Concluding remarks
In this paper we search for asymmetries in the policy responses of 7ve central banks
to in5ation and output gaps. We have argued that such responses can arise when the
Phillips curve underlying the derivation of the optimal policy rule is nonlinear. To test
for the existence of such asymmetric features we use two empirical approaches. The
7rst one is based on the estimation of a Euler equation which allows for the interaction
between expected in5ation and the output gap while the second relies on the estimation
of an ordered probit model to capture the discrete nature of changes in discount rates,
allowing again for the interaction term.
We 7nd signi7cant evidence of nonlinearity in the policy rules of four European
central banks after the 1980s, in the sense that they have tended to intervene with
more virulence when in5ation and output move above their target than what a linear
Taylor rule would predict. However, that is not the case for the Fed, where a linear
Phillips curve cannot be rejected. These contrasting results between European countries
and the US can be interpreted by the fact that the convexity of the Phillips curve relies
upon the existence of labour market rigidities and that those are much more severe in
the former than in the latter.
In sum, the results in this paper seem to con7rm the hypothesis that there are
nonlinearities in the operating procedures of central banks when setting a short-term
17
interest rate to control monetary policy. Taking them into consideration may turn out
to be helpful for 7nancial market analysts when they forecast the evolution of interest
rates on the basis of the already very popular usage of Taylor rules.
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